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Semmer: Semmer: Knowing and Voluntary Standard

The "Knowing and Voluntary"
Standard: Is the Sixth Circuit's Test
Enough to Level the Playing Field in
Mandatory Employment Arbitration?
Seawright v. American General FinancialServices'

I. INTRODUCTION
Most courts require that for an individual to waive her Seventh Amendment
right to trial by jury, she must knowingly and voluntarily waive that right.2 This
heightened requirement for waiver exists because the United States Supreme
Court has found that "[tlhe trial by jury is justly dear to the American people...
and every encroachment upon it has been watched with great jealousy." 3 Seemingly this standard should apply to mandatory employment arbitration agreements, as shifting the venue from the courts to the arbitral tribunal implicitly
means waiving the right to trial by jury. However, because the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") requires that enforcement of arbitration agreements rests on
contract standards of consent, most courts apply a less employee-protective test by
simply determining whether there were manifestations of mutual assent to the
arbitration agreement. 4 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, to the benefit of employees, does apply a "knowing and voluntary" test, as demonstrated by its decision in Seawright v. American General FinancialServices ("AGF"), but the definitional factors it examines seem to lack the comprehensiveness of tests outlined
by various commentators, 5 and it does not adequately address the "voluntariness"
aspect of the standard.
1I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In April 1999, AGF began informing its employees that it would implement
an Employee Dispute Resolution ("EDR") Program effective June 1, 1999. 6 Em1. 507 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2007).
2. See Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832-33 (4th Cit. 1986); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving
Trust, 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1985); Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d
Cir. 1977).
3. Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830).
4. Christopher J. Kippley & Richard A. Bales, Extending OWBPA Notice and Consent Protections
to ArbitrationAgreements Involving Employees and Consumers, 8 NEV. L.J. 10, 21 (Fall 2007).
5. See Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preferencefor
Binding Arbitration:A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separationof Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TuL. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (1997); see also Richard C. Reuben, ConstitutionalGravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1022
(2000).
6. Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs.,507 F.3d 967, 970 (6th Cir. 2007). The company informed
employees about the EDR program through a publication circulated to all company offices, including
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ployees were mailed an informational brochure which stated that the EDR program was the "sole means of resolving employment-related disputes" and that
"seeking, accepting, or continuing employment with AGF means that you agree to
resolve employment related claims against the company or another employee
through this process instead of through the court system.",7 Plaintiff Lisa Seawright, an employee of AGF since 1978, attended a group informational meeting
explaining the program and signed an attendance sheet indicating that she8 had
attended the informational session and received a copy of the EDR pamphlet.
Two years after the initiation of the EDR program, AGF mailed its employees
a letter that reminded them that the program was still in effect and explained how
to find additional information on the company's intranet website. 9 The brochure
that accompanied the letter also reminded the employees that the arbitration
agreement was binding and that continued employment meant that the employee
agreed to resolve any disputes with the company through arbitration. 10 Approximately six years after the implementation of the EDR Program, AGF fired Seawright." She filed suit against AGF for wrongful termination, and AGF responded with a motion to compel arbitration. 2 In Seawright's answer, she argued that:
(1) she did not assent to the EDR Program and that there was no bargained-for
exchange; (2) she did not enter into a written agreement as required by the FAA;
and (3) in the altemative, the arbitration agreement was void because it was a
contract of adhesion or was unconscionable. 13 The district court denied AGF's
motion to compel arbitration on the ground that there was no valid and enforceable agreement: receiving information and acknowledging the EDR Program did
not, by itself, mean that Seawright assented to the agreement; there was no bargained-for
exchange; and Seawright was unable to influence the terms of AGF's
14
policy.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Seawright's knowing continuation of employment after commencement of the arbitration program constituted acceptance of a valid and enforceable contract to arbitrate. 15 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that courts should enforce arbitration agreements as they would any
other condition of employment, as long as the arbitration agreement was not obtained through unfair means or was not substantively unfair. 16 Because AGF did
not try to hide its mandatory arbitration policy or deceive employees into agreeing
to the policy, and because it did not choose an arbitration forum that would discourage employees from submitting disputes or favor the employer in resolving

the office where Seawright was a branch manager, through letters mailed to employees, and through
group informational meetings. Id.
7. Id. at 970-71.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 971.
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. Id. Seawright alleged that AGF fired her in violation of Tennessee antidiscrimination law and the
Family and Medical Leave Act. Id. at 970.
13. Id. at 971.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 970.
16. Id. at 979.
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those disputes,' 7 the mandatory arbitration provision should be enforced, according to the Sixth Circuit. 18
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Supreme Court Precedenton Employment Arbitration
At English common law, and as adopted by American courts, arbitration
agreements were revocable by either party at any time prior to the issuance of an
arbitral award, 19 thus leading to the claim that common law courts were hostile to
arbitration agreements. 20 In an effort to reduce judicial opposition to arbitration
agreements, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925 requiring courts
to enforce arbitration agreements related to commerce and maritime transactions. 21 The FAA mandates that the arbitration clause be in writing and provides
that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.",22 Because arbitration agreements are placed on the same footing as any
other contract, state contract law applies to those agreements.23
In the first approximately sixty-five years following the enactment of the
FAA, the Supreme Court ruled on a number of cases affecting employment arbitration. The Court found arbitration agreements enforceable in claims arising
under the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890,24 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,25
the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), 26 and the Securities Act of 1933.27 Importantly, the Supreme Court has
stated repeatedly that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute;
it only submits to their resolu28
tion in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."
In 1991, the Court decided the "watershed employment arbitration case" 29 of
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., which held that a statutory claim of
discrimination could be subjected to mandatory arbitration pursuant to a pre17. All arbitrations under AFG's arbitration program are conducted under the rules of the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA"). Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 4, Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin.
Servs., No. 0-5091 (6th Cir. Filed Jun. 7, 2007).
18. Seawright, 507 F.3d at 979.
19. Richard A. Bales, Normative Considerationsof Employment Arbitrationat Gilmer's Quinceanera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 335 (2006) [hereinafter Normative Considerations].
20. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
21. Id. at 24-25.
22. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
23. See Seawright, 507 F.3d at 972 ("Because arbitration agreements are fundamentally contracts,
we review the enforceability of an arbitration agreement according to the applicable state law of contract formation.").
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-nn (2006).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2006); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26

(1991).
28. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
29. Richard A. Bales, ContractFormation Issues in Employment Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIS L.J.415,
420 (Winter 2006) [hereinafter ContractFormation].
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dispute arbitration agreement. 3° In Gilmer, the plaintiff was required by his employment with Interstate to register as a securities representative with several
stock exchanges. 31 His registration application provided, in part, that Gilmer
"agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy" arising between him and
Interstate. 3 2 After Gilmer was terminated from his employment, he filed an age
discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), and then filed a complaint in federal court alleging discrimination
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 33 In affirming the
Fourth Circuit and compelling arbitration, the Supreme Court reasoned that mere
inequality in bargaining power is not enough to hold that employment arbitration
agreements are never enforceable, and that such agreements will be enforced absent "the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic
power that would provide
34
grounds 'for the revocation of any contract.'
The Supreme Court did not provide much guidance as to when an arbitration
agreement would be sufficiently unbalanced to warrant voiding the agreement, so
lower courts often
inconsistently resolve claims of procedural unfairness and un35
conscionability.
B. "Knowing and Voluntary"
Though courts agree that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are usually enforceable, there are differences in the federal circuits as to whether a "knowing
and voluntary" standard should be applied to employment arbitration agreements. 36 The Sixth Circuit expressly adopted such a standard in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., when it listed five factors courts should evaluate in determining whether a plaintiff has knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to pursue employment claims in federal court: (1) plaintiff's experience, background,
and education; (2) the amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign
the waiver, including whether the employee had an opportunity to consult with a
lawyer; (3) the clarity of the waiver; (4) consideration for the waiver; and (5) the
30. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 23-24.
34. Id. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 627).
35. Bales, Contract Formation,supra note 29, at 420.
36. Id. at 449-50. The standard had its origins in PrudentialInsurance Company of America v. Lai,
42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994). Though the Ninth Circuit did not expressly use the word "voluntary," it
relied on a Supreme Court decision which mentioned the "knowing and voluntary" language in dicta.
See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 1974) ("In determining the effectiveness
of any such waiver, a court would have to determine at the outset that the employee's consent to the
settlement was voluntary and knowing."). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit is often credited with first
applying the "knowing and voluntary" standard. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 203
(2d Cir. 1998). The First Circuit has endorsed the standard without necessarily adopting it. See Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 143 (1st Cir. 1998). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit discussed
the advantage of applying a "knowing and voluntary" standard to a mandatory employment arbitration
agreement but decided against applying the standard. See Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc.,
121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997). The Third Circuit has expressly rejected the standard. See Seus v.
John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1998). The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, has
expressly adopted the standard. See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668 (6th Cir.
2003).
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totality of the circumstances. 37 The court determined that Morrison knowingly
and voluntarily waived her rights because she not only had a bachelor's degree in
engineering and a master's degree in administration, but she was a managerial
employee capable of understanding the terms of the agreement. 38 Furthermore,
the waiver of the right to file suit was clear, and Morrison did not allege that she
did not understand the agreement or that it was vague. 3 9 Lastly, because Morrison
and thus withhad three days in which to withdraw her consent to the agreement,
4
draw her application, she had time to consult with a lawyer. 0
C. Notice and Consent
Issues dealing with the "knowing" part of the standard relate to notice and
consent, required in contract law because a party cannot normally give consent to
a term of the contract without being afforded notice.4' While the FAA requires
the arbitration agreement to be in writing, it does not require signatures of the
affected parties. 42 As a result, it is usually enough that the party moving for arbitration is able to show "that the other party received a written copy of the arbitration agreement. 43 Companies seeking to bind employees to dispute resolution
programs attempt to notify their employees through a variety of communications
including website postings, mail, paycheck envelopes, and informational meetings. 44 Clearly, the argument for enforcement is the strongest when the employer
can show that the employee had actual knowledge that she agreed to the arbitration agreement, ideally through an employee signature.45 Absent such an explicit
agreement, whether notice is sufficient to create a binding arbitration agreement is
often a question for the courts, with answers varying throughout the circuits.
In Tinder v. Pinkerton Security, Pinkerton gave notice to employees about the
arbitration agreement by inserting an informational brochure into its employees'
paycheck envelopes. 46 When Tinder sued for discrimination, she claimed that she
could not remember receiving or seeing the arbitration brochure. 47 The Seventh
Circuit held that the distribution of brochures in paycheck envelopes was sufficient notice and compelled arbitration.4 8 In Hightower v. GMR1,Inc., the Fourth
Circuit found appropriate notice and enforced the arbitration claim when the employee had attended a meeting announcing the arbitration program and signed a

37. 317 F.3d 646, 668 (quoting Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995)).
38. Id. at 668.
39. Id. The application for employment provided that Circuit City would not consider any application unless the arbitration agreement, which required arbitration for any legal dispute relating to their
employment with the company, was signed. Id. at 654.
40. Id. at 668.
41. Bales, ContractFormation,supra note 29, at 435-36.
42. Id. at 435; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-3 (2006).
43. Bales, ContractFormation,supra note 29, at 435.
44. Id. at 436-42.
45. Id. at 435-36.
46. 305 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2002).
47. Id. at 732.
48. Id. at 736.
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form that stated, "I have
attended a DRP meeting and have received the informa' 9
tion in regards to DRP. A
On the other hand, courts will refrain from compelling arbitration where the
purported notice is insufficient. In Campbell v. General Dynamics Government
Systems Corp., the employer sent employees an email with intranet links to its
50
new Dispute Resolution Policy ("DRP").
The text of the email only briefly
mentioned arbitration and did not mention that the DRP would be binding on discrimination claims or that employees would be consenting by continued employment.51 Campbell stated that he had not read the email, and only learned of the
DRP after he had been fired. 52 While General Dynamics could show that Campbell opened the email, it could not show whether he clicked on the link that contained the DRP information, and the First Circuit
found that notice was insuffi53
cient to create a binding arbitration agreement.
Though employers must show that employees were properly notified of the
binding arbitration agreement, for the arbitration agreement to be valid, the employees must also consent to the agreement. While proving consent with a signed
acknowledgement is the most effective method, circumstances exist in which even
a signature will not compel arbitration. In Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses,
Inc., the company's managers placed an "x" in every place the applicant was told
to sign and instructed the applicant to sign without any explanation. 54 The managers usually did not mention the arbitration agreement, and the applicants did not
have the opportunity to take the agreement home to consider or to consult an attorney. 55 For these and other reasons,
the Sixth Circuit held that there was no
56
enforceable arbitration agreement.
Even without a signature consenting to arbitration, courts will often find that
consent is established through continued employment, if the arbitration agreement
calls for such consent. In Hardin v. First Cash FinancialServices, Hardin, an
assistant manager, sued her employer for sex discrimination. 57 Even though she
"unequivocally refused to consent" to the newly executed dispute resolution program, and in fact stated that her continued employment was not intended to serve
as consent, the Tenth Circuit held that by continuing work after the implementation date, Hardin
consented to the company's offer to alter the terms of her at-will
58
employment.
Though the "knowing" part of the "knowing and voluntary" standard is addressed by notice and consent, a more problematic issue is the "voluntary" aspect. 59 A common criticism of employment arbitration is that it is involuntaryboth because arbitration clauses are presented to employees as part of a standard
49. 272 F.3d 239, 241-43 (4th Cir. 2001).
50. 407 F.3d 546, 547-48 (1st Cir. 2005).
51. Id.
at548.
52. Id.
at549.
53. Id. at 548-49,559.
54. 400 F.3d 370, 374 (6th Cir. 2005).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 388. The Court also decided that consent was lacking because the company misrepresented
the terms of arbitration. Id.at 384-85.
57. 465 F.3d 470,472-73 (10th Cir. 2006).
58. Id.at 472, 478.
59. Bales, Contract Formation,supra note 29, at 450.
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contract which employees often sign without a full understanding and because the
agreement is offered on a take it or leave it, and be fired/not hired, basis.60 However, economic pressure does not by itself make the arbitration agreement unenforceable. 6' This is so for a variety of reasons. Arbitration agreements, like other
contracts, are usually enforceable despite unequal bargaining power. 62 Other
terms of employment, such as pension plans, severance pay, salary, and noncompetition agreements are enforceable despite economic pressure. 63 American employment law is based on the idea that individual employees do not have much
bargaining power and must organize into a union to protect their rights. 64
Whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable is subject to a variety of considerations regarding notice, consent, and voluntariness. Professor Bales recommends that employers who want to ensure that their program is enforceable follow
certain guidelines. He suggests that employers provide: (1) clearly drafted arbitration agreements which specify which claims are arbitrable and which claims are
not arbitrable; (2) sufficient time for employees to read the agreement and possibly consult a lawyer; (3) consideration in return for the employee's signing the
arbitration agreement. 65 Lastly, he suggests that employers obtain a signature
from each employee stating that the employee received and read the arbitration
agreement and that she understands and agrees to it. 66 Though an employee signature is not required by the FAA, the signature will make it easier for the
67 employer
to show that the employee received notice and consented to arbitration.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Seawright,the Sixth Circuit, reversing the district court's denial of the employer's motion to compel arbitration, found that Seawright's continued employment after the commencement of the arbitration
68 agreement constituted acceptance
of a valid and enforceable contract to arbitrate.
The first issue the Sixth Circuit addressed was whether Seawright's continued
employment with AGF manifested assent, which is required for the formation of a
valid contract. 69 The court determined that Tennessee contract law recognizes the
validity of unilateral contracts in which assent is indicated by action under the
contract, such as continued employment. 70 The Sixth Circuit, in rebutting an argument espoused by the district court-that "merely receiving information and
acknowledging the EDR program is not tantamount to assent"-reasoned that the
issue is not whether the receipt of an offer constitutes
acceptance but whether
71
continuing employment constitutes acceptance.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Stemlight, supra note 5, at 6.
Bales, Normative Considerations,supra note 19, at 375.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
Bales, Normative Considerations,supra note 19, at 375.
Id.
Bales, ContractFormation,supra note 29, at 459.
Id.
Id.
Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 507 F.3d 967, 970 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 972-94.
Id. at 972.
Id. at 973.
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Next, the court determined that Seawright "knowingly and voluntarily"
waived the right to sue in court by applying five factors previously established by
the Sixth Circuit: "(1) plaintiff's experience, background, and education; (2) the
amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign the waiver, including
whether the employee had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity
of the waiver; (4) consideration for the waiver; and (5) totality of the circumstances." 72 The court contended that Seawright met the "knowingly and voluntarily" requirement because she was an educated, managerial employee who was
capable of understanding the EDR Program, she had two months to consult with
an attorney, and the EDR Program clearly stated that employees
would be waiving
73
their rights to sue in court by continuing employment.
Briefly addressing the issue of consideration, the Sixth Circuit refuted the district court's argument that there was no bargained for exchange because Seawright
did not have the ability to affect the terms of AGF's policy.74 The court stated that
a mutual promise satisfies the consideration requirement, and because the arbitration process was binding on both Seawright and AGF, this requirement was satisfied.
On the issue of illusory contracts, the court noted that "Tennessee law requires that a contract ...impose genuine obligations on both parties. 76 Though
AGF "reserved the right to terminate the EDR program at any time, [it] also
agreed to be bound by the terms of the agreement for ninety days after giving
reasonable notice of the termination and as to all known disputes arising before
the date of termination. 77 Thus, the court determined that the reciprocal obligation to arbitrate claims arising in the ninety-day period satisfies the mutuality requirement.78
The court also rejected Seawright's argument that the arbitration agreement is
an unenforceable contract of adhesion and a result of unequal bargaining and procedural unconscionability. 79 The Sixth Circuit repeated Tennessee's standard for
finding a contract of adhesion in the employment context-that plaintiff would be
"unable to find suitable employment if she refused to sign [the employer's]
agreement.", 80 The court found that Seawright could not prove this element because she did not present evidence that she would be unable to find other suitable
employment if she did not sign AGF's arbitration agreement. 81 Furthermore, the
court noted that in Tennessee, adhesion contracts are only unenforceable when the
terms are "beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person, or oppressive or unconscionable." 82 The court dismissed Seawright's argument that procedural unconscionability resulted from unequal bargaining power because she did
not present evidence of any factors bearing on the relative bargaining positions of
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 974 (quoting Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Id. at 974.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 974-75.
Id. at 975.
Id.
Id. at 977.
Id. at 976.
Id.
Id. (quoting Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Tenn. 1996)).
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the two parties, including intelligence and experience, and because her education
and position as branch manager made it "unlikely that she could marshal such
evidence." 3 The court further distinguished Seawright from a low-level employee who might be "required to sign an arbitration agreement precisely at the
84
time that he or she is most willing to sign anything to get a job.
V. COMMENT
In Seawright, the defendant company created an almost legally airtight arbitration agreement by complying with nearly all of Professor Bales' recommendations for employers who want to ensure that their arbitration program is enforceable. First, the agreement was clearly drafted and specified which claims are arbitral-the program's informational brochure asserted that the EDR Program is the
"sole means of resolving employment-related disputes between you and the company or you and another employee, including disputes for legally protected rights
such as freedom from discrimination, retaliation, or harassment, unless otherwise
prohibited by law." 85 The agreement also clearly stated that employees were giving up the right to trial. 86 Second, the employees, including Seawright, had sufficient time to read the agreement and consult a lawyer, since they were first informed of the program approximately two months before the program took effect. 87 Third, consideration for the employee's agreement existed in the form of
continuation of employment. While some commentators argue that employment
as consideration is illusory because most employees who sign arbitration agreements are "at will" employees and thus can be fired at any time for any nondi88
a few courts find continued employment to be sufficient
scriminatory reason,
89
consideration.
AGF's arbitration agreement did not, however, comply with Bales' final recommendation, that the employer obtain a signature from the employee stating that
she received the agreement, understood its terms, and agreed to its terms. Still,
AGF had a strong case against Seawright, as the facts do not show any of the typical reasons why arbitration agreements are held unenforceable: AGF, like Seawright, was bound to arbitration, so mutuality of obligation was satisfied; the
arbitration agreement was not buried in other paperwork relating to employment
and instead was mailed to employees, posted on the company's intranet website,
and discussed with employees at an informational meeting; the employees were
not discouraged from reading the agreement and consulting an attorney or rushed
through signing any paperwork, as they had approximately two months to consider the agreement; and the agreement did not foist unreasonable arbitration expenses or other unreasonable arbitration terms onto employees.

83. Id. at 977.
84. Id. (citing Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 504 (6th Cir. 2004)).

85. Id. at 971.
86. Id. The EDR agreement stated that "[T]he Program must be used instead of a trial if you are not
satisfied with the results of the government agency process." Id.
87. Id. at 970.
88. Kippley & Bales, supra note 4, at 33.
89. See, e.g., Hardin v. First Cash Fin. Servs., 465 F.3d 470,478 (Okla. 2006).
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Most importantly, Plaintiff Seawright had the benefit of the Sixth Circuit's
"knowing and voluntary" standard. This standard usually applies to waivers of
constitutional rights, including the right to trial by jury, which is implicitly
stripped by arbitration agreements, but the Ninth Circuit appears to have adopted
the standard and the Sixth Circuit has expressly adopted it for arbitration agreements. 90 Such a standard serves to the benefit of employees; while most courts
apply a less protective test by simply determining whether assent was mutually
manifested by objective standards, the "knowing
and voluntary" standard ex91
amines whether there was actual mutual assent.
The five factors for determining whether a waiver was "knowing and voluntary," as applied by the Sixth Circuit to Seawright's case, allow for a court to examine the individual circumstances to determine whether the agreement should be
enforced. Seemingly these factors, particularly the "totality of the circumstances"
factor, give a court an opening for finding an arbitration agreement unenforceable
due to procedural or substantive unconscionability.
However, some of the factors outlined by the Sixth Circuit's "knowing and
voluntary" test do not adequately address the realities faced by employees. For
example, under the prong related to plaintiff's experience, background, and education, the court placed much reliance on the fact that Seawright was an educated,
managerial employee who was capable of understanding AGF's arbitration program.
Yet commentators believe that even college-educated, highly compensated employees have misconceptions about employment law. Pauline Kim found
that even these workers could not identify whether a discharge was lawful more
than half the time and believes that these employees are "seriously misinformed., 93 So, while the Sixth Circuit's reliance on Seawright's education and
experience suggests that it might have decided the case differently if the plaintiff
was not similarly situated, the courts, perhaps erroneously, agree that educated,
managerial employees are capable of deciphering arbitration agreements.
In addition, the Sixth Circuit's reliance on the amount of time Seawright had
to consider the arbitration agreement before it took effect likewise is of questionable relevance to whether the agreement was "voluntarily" entered into. The
agreement is binding on employees regardless of how much time an employee has
to consider the agreement, and an employee is "unlikely to devote resources to try
to understand something that he or she cannot change or escape., 94 Whether an
employee has twenty-four hours or two months to consider an arbitration agreement, if she needs to work and does not believe she can reasonably find another
job, she will consent to the agreement, making her "voluntariness" doubtful. Unfortunately for Plaintiff Seawright, she did not present any evidence that she
would be unable to find suitable employment if she refused to sign the arbitration

90. See Christine M. Reilly, Comment, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the ContractingStage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1203,
1217-19 (2002).
91. See Kippley & Bales, supra note 4, at 21.
92. Seawright, 507 F.3d at 974.
93. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal
Protection in an at-will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 144-45 (1997).
94. Reilly, supra note 90, at 1235.
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agreement. 95 Even if she could make such a showing, it is unrealistic to believe
that an employee, such as Seawright, who worked for AGF for more than twenty
years would voluntarily uproot and risk losing a job she enjoyed and co-workers
she respected over an arbitration agreement whose terms she may not have fully
understood or appreciated. Thus the Sixth Circuit's "knowing and voluntary" test
fails to adequately address the realities faced by employees.
Furthermore, the test seems to lack the comprehensiveness of tests outlined
by various commentators. Professor Jean R. Sternlight advocates for a four-factor
test which examines: (1) the visibility and clarity of the agreement; (2) the relative
knowledge and economic power possessed by the parties; (3) the degree of voluntariness of the purported agreement; and (4) the substantive fairness of the purported agreement. While this test bears resemblance to the Sixth Circuit's test,
as it too looks at knowledge of the parties and clarity of the waiver, it seems to
place more emphasis on factors which probably weigh in a plaintiff/employee's
favor. For example, under Sternlight's test, any time a large corporation conditions employment on an employee signing an arbitration agreement, the economic
power factor would weigh in favor of the employee because "few would doubt
that an average employee presented by her employer with an employment arbitration agreement on a 'take-it-or-be-fired' basis faces substantial economic pressure
to sign the agreement." 97 The same rationale can be used to show that the third
factor, voluntariness, weighs in favor of the employee.
It is worth noting, however, that applying Sternlight's test would likely result
in the same outcome for Seawright. Sternlight argues that where all factors do not
point in the same direction, as is the case where the arbitration agreement is clear
but the party being bound to arbitrate is "ill-informed" and "required to accept the
clause in order to obtain a particular service," the court should focus on the substantive fairness of the agreement in determining whether the party waived her
rights. 98 In Seawright's case, she did not argue that the arbitration agreement was
substantively unconscionable, and the Sixth Circuit "could not hold" that the
agreement was substantively unconscionable. 99 The court found that the underlying agreement was equitable in binding both employer and employee to arbitration, and that AGF did not select an arbitration forum that discouraged employees
from submitting disputes or favored the employer in the resolution of those disputes. 1°° So, while Stemlight's test might favor plaintiff/employees in some cases, the case against Seawright was strong enough to withstand a heightened waiver analysis.
Professor Richard Reuben advocates a three-prong test which likewise seems
to address factors that are more favorable to plaintiff/employees. His test examines: "(1) the visibility and clarity of the waiver agreement on its face, (2) the
general contractual environment in which the waiver was secured, and (3) the

95. Seawright, 507 F.3d at 976. Such a showing would have enabled the court to find the contract
adhesive. Id.
96. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 57-58.
97. Bales, ContractFormation, supra note 29, at 450.
98. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 60.
99. Seawright, 507 F.3d at 977.
100. Id. at 979.
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°
specific facts and circumstances of the actual bargaining over the waiver."''
Again, like the Sixth Circuit's test, Reuben's test considers the clarity of the
agreement, and the "general contractual environment," which seems akin to "totality of the circumstances," but his third element appears to weigh heavily in favor
of the plaintiff/employee, particularly where the only thing of value received by
the plaintiff in exchange for the arbitration agreement is continued employment.
In most cases where a large corporation conditions employment on signing a
waiver, there would appear to be no "actual bargaining" whatsoever. These mandatory arbitration agreements are called "take it or leave it" agreements because
an employee must consent to arbitrate or lose his or her job.
However, given the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA as favoring
arbitration over litigation,' 0 the element of voluntariness, present in both Sternlight and Reuben's tests, and arguably manifested in the Sixth Circuit's test
through the "totality of the circumstances" prong, cannot be determinative. If the
"take it or leave it" nature of an arbitration agreement were enough to invalidate
the agreement, an overwhelming number of arbitration programs in the employment arena would be invalidated.
Thus, while a "knowing and voluntary" standard protects employees more
than the more common mutual assent requirement and is supported by many scholars as a means of leveling the playing field between employers and employees,
the effectiveness of the standard in addressing voluntariness is still questionable
and will vary greatly depending on how the standard is defined. 0 3 The five factors outlined by the Sixth Circuit do not seem to address practical realities faced
by employees and appear to fall short of truly addressing whether the agreement is
"voluntary," particularly if the courts do not place much weight in the "totality of
the circumstances" prong. The Sixth Circuit is a step ahead of most other Courts
of Appeals in applying a "knowing and voluntary" standard to mandatory arbitration agreements, but the definition of the standard still needs work if employees
are to truly operate on a more level playing field with their employers.

VI. CONCLUSION
Based on current law relating to employment arbitration, the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Seawright v. American General FinancialServices was expected and
had a seemingly fair result. Though Seawright never signed the arbitration
agreement and instead assented to it through continued employment, the time and
opportunity she had to consult with a lawyer, the clarity of the waiver, and her
position as a managerial employee all point toward a knowing and voluntary
waiver of her right to a jury trial, as required by the Sixth Circuit. While the application of a "knowing and voluntary" standard is advocated by numerous commentators' ° 4 and does provide heightened protection for employees, the defini101. Reuben, supra note 5, at 1022.
102. Stemlight, supra note 5, at 10.
103. See Reilly, supra note 90, at 1224. One of the problems with the "knowing and voluntary"
requirement is that the term is not well-defined by the courts. Id.
104. See Kippley & Bales, supra note 4, at 13; see generally, Sternlight, supra note 5 (suggesting that
a major problem concerning arbitration agreements is that those signing and binding themselves to the
agreement fail to do so voluntarily).
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tional factors applied by the Sixth Circuit do not really address the voluntariness
prong of the standard. As only the Sixth Circuit, and seemingly the Ninth Circuit,
apply such a standard to mandatory arbitration agreements, employees will be best
served if, when and if other circuits adopt a "knowing and voluntary" standard,
they define the standard to expressly include an examination of the relative economic powers of the parties, whether and to what extent there was actual bargaining, and whether the agreement was "take it or leave it"-factors which better
indicate the true voluntariness of the agreement.
CHRISTINA SEMMER
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